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I. Introduction

[W]hile religious institutions are not exempt from
local zoning laws, greater flexibility is required in
evaluating an application for a religious use than an
application for another use and every effort to
accommodate the religious use must be made.'
Historically, Americans have enjoyed broad rights to express
their religious beliefs and own property free from unwarranted
intrusions by the government. The conflict between religious freedom
and government regulation is often witnessed in the clash between
religious uses of property and zoning ordinances that regulate those
property uses. This was recently illustrated in City of Boerne v.
Flores,2 when the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute
requiring that a higher judicial standard of scrutiny be applied to
governmental infringements upon the exercise of religion. The Court
upheld a zoning ordinance that prevented approval of a building
permit to expand the size of a church building.
The impact of zoning on religious uses has become
increasingly controversial for a variety of reasons, but largely because
of rapid suburban growth? For many years, mainly Judaeo-Christian
institutions were allowed to use real property for their religious
services and related activities. Recently though, other faiths have
surfaced seeking the same uses and are meeting both legitimate and

Matter of Genesis Assembly of God v. Davies, 617 N.Y.S.2d 202,203 (2d
Dep't 1994).
2
__U.S.___, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1997).

See Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the
First Amendment [hereinafter Zoning the Church], 64 B.U.L. REV. 767, 768
(1984).
3

1998]

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND ZONING

illegitimate opposition.4 Additionally, religious establishments have
become more active politically and are apt to utilize the judicial and
legislative systems to protect their interests.5 The burgeoning number
of land uses that religious institutions sponsor, including day care
centers, homeless shelters, soup kitchens and broadcasting centers,
has caused zoning boards and courts to reevaluate the land use needs
of religious establishments.
The conflict between the freedom to exercise one's religion
and the power of government to implement zoning ordinances to
benefit the public's health, safety, welfare and morals will be
examined in this paper, focusing specifically on approaches
undertaken by New York local governments. At the outset, the
limitations and conditions that have emerged regarding religious uses
of property will be discussed. Federal and state laws, specifically the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)6 will be addressed in
relation to the Supreme Court's nullification of RFRA in Boerne v.
Flores.
This paper will examine the definitions, purposes and
applications of land use technology in relation to religious uses of
property. Considered in this discussion will be special use permits,
non-conforming uses, accessory uses, landmark preservation
designations, variances and home worship. The legality of zoning
approaches employed by New York's local governments will be
examined through analysis of case law and zoning ordinances.
II. Zoning By Local Governments
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty,7 upheld local governments' authority to zone pursuant to their
See id. at n. 11 (citing Town FearofMoon Church Persists,N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 1981, § 1 at 10; Study Finds Anti-Semitic Acts Rose Again in Year, N.Y.
4

TIMES, Jan. 6, 1982, at B10).
5
See Zoning the Church, supranote
6

7

3, at 768.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1983).
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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police powers.8 Zoning restrictions imposedby local governments
must reasonably and substantially relate to police power objectives
such as protecting the public safety, health, morals and welfare.'
"Being in derogation of the common law, zoning ordinances must be
strictly construed against the enacting and enforcing municipality."' °
In Nectow v. City of Cambridge,the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The governmental power to interfere by zoning
regulations with the general rights of the land owner
by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited,
and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be
imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."
Although the authority to enact police power regulations is vested in
state legislatures, this power has been delegated to local
governments.12 This transfer of zoning authority is generally found
in enabling acts or, in a few instances, state constitutional provisions
allowing for "home rule."' 3 The Standard Zoning Enabling Act is a
See Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Zoning Private and ParochialSchoolsCould Local Governments Restrict Socrates andAquinas? in, 1993 ZONING AND
PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK, § 12.02 (Kenneth H. Young ed.) [hereinafter Zoning
PrivateandParochialSchools].
9
Id.
10
Catholic Charities of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Syracuse v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals of the City of Norwich, 590 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920 (3d Dep't 1992).
n1
277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
12

See LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION, PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING

PRACTICE 16-17 (Brian W. Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein, eds. 1989).
13

See CRAIG A. PETERSON & CLAIRE MCCARTHY, HANDLING ZONING AND

LAND USE LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 1-4 (1982). For an example of New
York State's delegation of zoning authority to the Town Board, see N.Y. TOWN
LAW § 261 (McKinney 1997), which states:
For the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the
general welfare of the community, the town board is hereby
empowered by ordinance to regulate and restrict the height,
number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the
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model for zoning provisions that has been adopted by forty-seven
jurisdictions. 4 State delegation statutes grant local governments the
authority to adopt zoning provisions for the "purpose of promoting
health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the community...,,""
Local governments regularly enact zoning ordinances that
limit or regulate property owned by religious congregations or
organizations. These restrictions take the form of total exclusions
from a community, partial exclusions from a community, and
conditions attached to the uses of property. 6
Most of the litigation in New York arises from the partial
exclusion of religious uses of property from a community. For nearly
fifty years New York local governments have known that the
exclusion of religious uses was beyond their authority. 7 Recently, in
Cornell University v. Bagnardi8 the court stated, "[B]ecause of the
inherently beneficial nature of churches and schools to the public, we
held that the total exclusion of such institutions from a residential
district serves no end that is reasonably related to the morals, health,
welfare and safety of the community."

percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts,

and other open spaces, the density of population, and the
location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade,
14
15

16

industry, residence or other purposes ....
See PETERSON &MCCARTHY, supranote 13 §§ 1-4.
See id.
See Zoning Privateand ParochialSchools, supranote 8, §12.03

See Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of the North Shore Inc. v.
Incorporated Village of Rosalyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283 (N.Y. 1975), where the
court held that the benefits attributable to public worship conflict with the local
17

interest in preventing detrimental impacts on the surrounding neighborhood, and

where this conflict cannot be reconciled by imposing reasonable conditions on the
religious land use, the interests of the neighborhood must yield to the interests of
public worship.
18
68 N.Y.2d 583, 594 (N.Y. 1986).
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II. Religious Uses
A. Freedom of Religion and Constitutional Considerations
The United States Constitution states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof..

."

This clause is made applicable to the

states and their instrumentalities via the Fourteenth Amendment. 0
This protection is two-fold. First, the government may not create laws
that establish religion. Secondly, the government may not create laws
that unduly inhibit or prevent the exercise of religion.2' Prior to
Employment Division, Dep 't of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,2 2 to establish that a government action violated the second
restriction, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the action burdened
or "interfere[d] with the practice of a legitimate religious belief."23
If the plaintiff was able to prove this burden, the government then had
to submit evidence of a compelling governmental interest in not
exempting the use from the questioned action.24
The Smith 5 Court, however, held that the government need
not show a compelling basis for burdening a religious organization or
person engaged in obeying religious dictates when it imposes a
19

U.S. CONST.

amend. I.

See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
21
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993) (invalidating local ordinances that prevented group from practicing its
religion); Cf, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n.., 485 U.S. 439
(1988) (holding that free exercise clause did not prevent Forest Service's plans to
permit timber harvesting in area of forest that group used for religious purposes).
22
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
20

24

See id.

The Court in Smith allowed Oregon's drug laws to be enforced against
members of the Native American Church who believed that peyote embodies their
deity and that ingesting it was an act of worship and communion. The plaintiffs
were discharged from their jobs as drug counselors at a rehabilitation center and
denied unemployment benefits because of an Oregon statute that denied benefits
to employees who had been discharged for work-related misconduct.
25
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facially neutral requirement of general applicability. The U.S.
Supreme Court devised a new test regarding exercise of religion
claims, stating, "if prohibiting the exercise of religion.., is not the
object of the [regulation] but merely the incidental effect of generally
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has
' In response to the Supreme Court's decision,
not been offended."26
Congress enacted the Religious Freedoms Restoration Act (RFRA or
Act).2 The Act prevented federal, state and local governments from
substantially burdening the exercise of religion even if the burden
resulted from a neutral rule of general application. RFRA applied a
strict scrutiny test to all laws burdening religious practice and
required the government to demonstrate that the application of its
burden to a religious activity is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest.28 The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated RFRA in its
recent decision in City ofBoerne which had the effect of restoring the
29
test set out in Smith.
B. Broad Range of Religious Use Definitions
In order to be considered a religious land use, the property
must be used, on a regular basis, for religious services, such as a place
of worship, or other activity related to the institution's religious
mission.3" Religious uses of property include, in addition to houses
of worship, home prayer services, homeless shelters, day care centers,

494 U.S. at 878.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
28
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1
29
117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997).
30
See Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970)(holding that ordinance did not allow the use of a minister's home as "church
or rectory").
26
27
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and other religion-sponsored services.31 Courts typically have been
32
flexible in interpreting and defining what constitutes a religious use.
In Catholic Charities of the Roman Catholic Diocese of
Syracuse v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Norwich33 a
church used a building as a convent for nuns.34 The building was
purchased by the petitioner and used as a counseling center for
community residence programs for domestic violence victims and
administrative offices. 35 Having used the building for six years for
these programs, the petitioner applied for a certificate of occupancy
which was subsequently denied by the City of Norwich?6 The zoning
ordinance allowed for "Church-Non-Profit" uses in the residential
zone where the building was located.37 On appeal, the Zoning Board
of Appeals rejected the petitioner's attempt to have its uses defined
under "Church-Non-Profit," finding it to be "an intrusive
contradiction to the definition of 'R-1 Residential District.' 38 The
court annulled the determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals.
The City contended that the petitioner's use of the property
was more intensive than uses ordinarily associated with residentially

31

But cf Yeshiva & Mesivta Toras Chaim v. Rose, 523 N.Y.S.2d 907 (2d

Dep't 1988) (upholding zoning board's denial of a permit to build a center for
study of the Holocaust. The court held that pursuant to the town's zoning
ordinance, the study of the Holocaust did not constitute a "religious use.").
32
See, e.g., Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 319 N.Y.S.2d 937
(Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1971) (finding that a facility that assisted young drug
users in "finding their way" constituted a religious use of property).
33
590 N.Y.S.2d 918 (3d Dep't 1992).
34
35
36

See id.
Id. at 904, 919
See id.

See id.In R-1 residential zones, the zoning ordinance permitted the
following uses:
[S]ingle family dwelling, private school/library, parks,
playground and Church-Non-Profit. [Other uses granted by
special use permit] include: two-family dwellings, hospital,
sanitarium/rest home and essential public services.
38
Id.
37
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zoned districts.39 In addition, the City argued that the Zoning Board
of Appeals' interpretation of "Church-Non-Profit" was reasonably
related to preserving the integrity and character of the single-family
neighborhood.4" The court, however, found that the petitioner
conducted non-profit activities and, based on its mission statement,
had substantial ties with the Catholic Church." The focus of the
court's analysis was the term "non-profit."42 In this respect, the court
found that the record clearly indicated that the petitioner had
conducted non-profit activities in relation to its church activities.43
C. Protection of Religious Uses from Zoning Restrictions
Religious uses of property are somewhat insulated from the
restrictive provisions of zoning ordinances." It has been stated that
"... New York adheres to the majority view that religious institutions
are beneficial to the public welfare by their very nature.
Consequently, a proposed religious use should be accommodated,
even when it would be inconvenient for the community. 45 However,
in other states, courts have held that religious institutions may be
completely excluded from a particular area, such as a residential
district, provided that the community provides sufficient alternative
sites.46

39

See id ,

40

See id.

41
42
43
44

See id.
See id.
See id.

See Zoning Privateand ParochialSchools, supra note 8, § 12.02

Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity v. Rosenfeld, 458
N.Y.S.2d 920, 925-26 (2d Dep't 1983) (citations omitted); see also North Shore
Unitarian Soc'y, Inc. v. Village of Plandome, 109 N.Y.S.2d 803 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1951) (invalidating ordinance that totally excluded religious uses from a
45

community).
46

See Lakewood, Ohio Cong. Of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of

Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 309 (6thCir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 72 (1984).
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Since religious uses and institutions are considered beneficial
to the public welfare, they must be accessible to the community and
not zoned into an uninhabited comer of the neighborhood.47 Further,
although a religious use may generate increased traffic and noise in
the community, it cannot be excluded unless it presents a potential
hazard to the public health or welfare; mere inconvenience is not a
valid basis for total exclusion of a religious use.48 Zoning ordinances
may sometimes impact religious institutions by preventing them from
expanding, building, or existing in certain areas. Overall, these types
of restrictions protect some aspect of the public's health, safety, or
welfare.49
Generally, courts balance a religious establishment's First
Amendment claim and the government's interest in restricting
religious land uses to determine whether an unconstitutional violation
has occurred. The government's interests are usually based on
public welfare, safety and health concerns such as traffic, noise,

47

ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §

12.21 (3d ed. 1986).
Religious uses, possibly to a greater extent than is true of most
uses, must be centrally located. Commonly, they serve a limited
primary area; the efficiency of their service would be impaired
if they were required to locate in places not convenient or
accessible to their members. Id.
48
See Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village of
Roslyn, 38 N.Y.2d 283 (N.Y. 1975), cert. denied,426 U.S. 895 (1976).
49
See, e.g., Assembly of God Church of Bay Shore, New York, Inc. v. Islip
Town Bd., 644 N.Y.S.2d 750 (2d Dep't 1996) (upholding town board's denial of
religious institution's application for relaxation of restrictions on expansion and
parking. Said expansion would have caused parking and traffic problems).
CompareWestchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 493 (N.Y. 1968)
("when the.., religious needs of the community have grown, so that existing
structures are inadequate, the same reasoning which we applied to the initial
construction or use of the facilities must pertain to a proposed expansion or
modification of the facilities.").
so
See Milwaukie Co. Of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 330 P.2d 5 (Or.
1958) (balancing the allegations of religious discrimination with the potential
traffic hazards that would result from erection of a church, the court upheld the city
council's decision to reject the building permit).
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character of the neighborhood and parking availability. However,
most New York courts' decisions are exclusively based on police
powers, seldom considering First Amendment implications. This is
due to the fact that in New York, courts have generally favored
religious institutions and liberally construed their land uses.5
A case that exemplifies a combination of many of these
zoning concerns is LeBlanc v. Village of Airmont,52 in which the
Second Circuit held that a group of Orthodox Hasidic Jews had
suffered discrimination from a neighborhood association and the
Town Council when the group was refused permits for home-located
synagogues. 3
In the 1980s, the Orthodox Jewish population dramatically
increased in the Town of Ramapo (Town). 4 Consequently, Orthodox
Jewish religious needs increased. 5 During this time, these needs
were accommodated by existing local ordinances. 6 Although
Ramapo's ordinances permitted places of worship to be built on two
acre lots, this cost was beyond the means of most of the Jewish
community. 7 However, the zoning code also allowed for "home
professional offices" and permitted clergy to operate offices within
their homes.58 The Town amended its code by permitting home
51
See generally Holy Spirit Ass'n, 458 N.Y.S.2d 920 (holding that religious
institutions should be accommodated despite inconvenience to the surrounding
community).

67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995).
See id.
54
See id. at 417.
55
See id.
56
See id. at 416. Adherence to Orthodox Judaism demands a significant
number of local religious houses of worship. On the Sabbath day and religious
holidays, Jews are prohibited from using automobiles and must walk to their places
of worship. Therefore, the houses of worship must be centrally located to the
practicing population.
57
See id. at 417.
58
The code allowed home professional office use to be:
incidental and secondary to the use of the residence for dwelling
purpose, shall not change the character thereof and shall not
have any evidence of such accessory use other than a permitted
52

53
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synagogues. 59 The provision allowed for rabbis to conduct services in
their houses as long as the group did not exceed forty-nine people."
A neighborhood organization, Airmont Civic Association, Inc.
(ACA) sought incorporation of the Village of Airmont (Village) in
addition to extensive zoning reform.' Prior to the Village's
incorporation in April 1991, several ACA members allegedly
announced that the purpose of the ACA was to keep the Jews out of
the Airmont neighborhood. 62 Jewish community residents sued in
federal court alleging that their First Amendment rights had been
violated by the Village's incorporation and sought injunctive relief
and damages.63 The United States additionally initiated an action
against the Village and its trustees claiming that the incorporation was
based on discriminatory motives.' The Village had adopted its own
code establishing a Zoning Board of Appeals and Planning Board.65

announcement sign. Said activity shall not occupy more than
one-half (1/2) of the ground floor area of the residence or its
equivalent elsewhere in the residence if so used. In said activity,
no more than two (2) persons, including members of the family
residing on the premises, shall be employed. Permissible 'home
professional office' uses include, but are not limited to, the
following: clergymen, lawyers, physicians, dentists, architects,
engineers or accountants.
Ramapo Code § 376-181 at 37,678.
59
67 F.3d at 418.
60
See id.
61
See id.
62
See id.at 419.
63
Seeid.at 416.
64
See id. at 419.
65

The Airmont Code required:
that a home professional office shall be incidental and secondary
to the use of the residence for dwelling purpose, shall not change
the character thereof and shall not have any evidence of such
accessory use other than a permitted announcement sign. It is the
intent of this Local Law that the home professional office shall
not generate activities that come into a residential area so as to
detract from the residential character of the area. Said activity
shall not occupy more than one-half ('2)of the ground floor area

1998]

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND ZONING

321

Evidence of the alleged discrimination was based on the ACA's
opposition to building permit applications filed by rabbis for
construction of synagogues.66
The defendants alleged that the zoning policy was nondiscriminatory and based on legitimate zoning concerns such as
increased traffic and particular construction upon a flood plain.67 The
court found the evidence sufficient to establish that the Village had
violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights as well as the Fair
Housing Act based on its discriminatory intent in enacting the zoning
ordinance code.68
Recently, in Mount Pleasant, New York, a religious group
purchased 264 acres of property for $33.4 million. The group,
Legionaries of Christ, purchased the land from IBM which used the
property as a corporate training facility.69 The Legionaries planned
on using the facility, pursuant to the existing special zoning for IBM's
training facility, as a seminary. 0 The Town contends that the zoning
designation for the property permits only business uses and not

of the residence or its equivalent elsewhere in the residence if so
used. In said activity, no more than two (2) persons, including

members of the family residing on the premises, shall be
employed. Permissible 'home professional office' uses include,

but are not limited to, the following: clergymen, lawyers,
physicians, dentists, architects, engineers or accountants, if said

use meets the other requirements of this Local Law. Any
aggrieved person shall apply to the Zoning Board of Appeals for
an interpretation as to whether or not a proposed activity or use
constitutes a permissible home professional! office. It is the
intent of the Local law thatthe home professional office shall
only be an accessory use and thattthe residential character of the

neighborhood involved shalrbe maintained at all times.
Airmont Code, art. XVIII(2).
6
67 F.3d at 419.
67
68
69
70

See id. at 421.
See id. at 424.

THE DAILYNEWS, Aug. 24, 1997, at 3A.
See id.
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religious uses, but that the group may apply for a variance."
However, the Legionaries believe that their use of the property is the
same as IBM's - for an educational and training center! 2 Presently,
the Town is pursuing a declaratory judgment to determine whether
the zoning of the property may properly include the Legionaries'
religious use.'
Complete exclusion of religious uses from a community is
undoubtedly unconstitutional because the local zoning authority
would not be acting within one of its police power objectives.74 In
North Shore 5 the court stated that municipalities could not exclude
places of religious worship from the community because such an act
would not benefit the community's safety, health, morals, or general
welfare.
In American Friends of the Society of St. Pius, Inc. v.
Schwab,76 a village denied site approval to proposed construction of
a church in a residentially zoned area. The issue before the court was

71

See id.

72

See id.

See id. Compare Westbury Hebrew Congregation v. Downer, 302
N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1969) in which the court reasoned that
since there would be no physical changes in the structure of a building, the
alteration of uses would not require the religious society to conform to additional
acre requirements. The religious society wanted to teach secular subjects at its
religious school, thereby making its designation a parochial school. Id at 924. The
ordinance required parochial schools to have fifty acres, but did not apply the same
requirement to public schools. Id. at 925.
74
ROBERT M.ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 12.22 (3d ed. 1983).
However, in other states, complete exclusion from certain districts within a
community is permissible. For example, in Messiah Baptist Church v. County of
Jefferson, State of Colorado, 859 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1988), a church alleged that
a zoning ordinance unconstitutionally excluded it from building in an agricultural
zone. The court upheld the zoning ordinance stating that it was reasonable and did
not infringe upon religious beliefs of the church's participants. Additionally, the
court stated that exclusion of churches from residential districts was not a per se
arbitrary and capricious action by the zoning board.
75
109 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1951).
76
417 N.Y.S.2d 991 (2d Dep't 1979).
73
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"whether a local zoning power may completely bar a religious
organization from using its property for church purposes in an area
zoned for residential use."77 The village claimed that the proposed
construction would depreciate the value of their properties because of
fire and traffic hazards, in addition to "adversely affect[ing] the
' The court,
health, safety and welfare of residents of the village."78
recognizing that in some instances public officials may prohibit
religious land uses, stated
Human experience teaches us that public officials,
when faced with pressure to bar church uses by those
residing in a residential neighborhood, tend to avoid
any appearance of an anti-religious stance and temper
their decision by carefully couching their grounds for
refusal to permit such use in terms of traffic dangers,
fire hazards and noise and disturbance, rather than on
such crasser grounds as lessening of property values
or loss of open space or entry of strangers into the
neighborhood or undue crowding of the area. Under
such circumstances it is necessary to most carefully
scrutinize the reasons advanced for a denial to insure
that they are real and not merely pretexts used to
preclude the exercise of constitutionally protected
privileges.79
The court considered the surrounding property owners' contention
that increased traffic, loss of open space and sewage increases would
affect property values.8 " The court found that since the applicant
offered to comply with all safety provisions, the denial of the permit
was premature.81 The court held that a zoning board must make

77

78
79

80

81

Id. at 992

Id.
Id. at 993.
See id. at 993-94
See id.
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reasonable efforts to accommodate the establishment of a church,
while "mitigating the detrimental'or adverse effects of such use upon

the community. 82
Partial exclusion, through rejection of specific permit
applications, of religious uses from a community may be justified if
the public's safety, health or welfare are compromised.83 New York
courts have held that a permit application for a religious land use may
not be rejected because of possible increased traffic,84 loss of
potential tax revenue85 or adverse affects upon real estate values.8 6 In
82

Id. at 994.

See Matter of Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 494
(N.Y. 1968) where the court held that a religious land use permit may be
conditioned if it is "convincingly shown that [it] will have a direct and immediate
adverse effect upon the health, safety or welfare of the community." Here, the
Planning Commission required specific front and side-yard setbacks for a
synagogue's proposed expansion. The court held that the Commission's power to
determine such setbacks did not violate the congregation's constitutional rights;
however, the unnecessary $100,000 that the synagogue would incur in order to
comply with the setbacks was viewed by the court as having abridged the religious
freedom of the congregants.
83

84

See id.

In Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, I N.Y.2d
508 (N.Y. 1956), the court held that a Planning Board arbitrarily and capriciously
denied a permit to build a church. The Diocese sought to build a church in a
convenient location because its congregation had significantly increased. See id. at
514. The Town of Brighton had been zoned into four districts: Residential,
Commercial, Industrial, and Agricultural. See id.
These districts were subdivided
into classes A, B, and C. See id.
The Diocese planned to build the church and
school in a class A district which was zoned for:
(1) Single family one or two story or two and one-half story
detached dwelling, with private garage.
(2) Educational or Religious Building, Fire Station, Town
Municipal Building, Police Station, Park and Park Buildings, if
approved by the Planning Board.
Id.
At the public hearing concerning the Diocese's application for a building permit
and variance, residents alleged that the church would be an inconvenience,
annoyance and would adversely affect property values. See id.
at 516. The Planning
Board denied the application, stating that the church would change the character
85
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Neddermeyer v. Town of OntarioPlanningBoard,87 the court stated,
"It
is presumed that a religious use will have a beneficial effect in a
residential area. That presumption, however, may be rebutted with
evidence of a significant impact 'on traffic congestion, property
values, municipal services' and the like.,88 However, the absolute
exclusion of these uses from residential areas would not further the
public welfare, safety, health and morals.8 9
Although religious uses of property may sometimes be
morally or socially offensive, they are nonetheless constitutionally
protected. For example, in Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah,90 the U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional an
ordinance that restricted the slaughtering of animals for religious
purposes. There, the petitioner church and its constituents practiced
the religion of Santeria, which requires the sacrifice of animals that
are subsequently consumed by the congregants!' The church leased
property within the respondent city and intended to build a house of
worship.' The city council enacted emergency ordinances restricting
the sacrificing of animals for ritualistic purposes.93 The U.S.
Supreme Court found that these ordinances lacked neutrality because
they were specifically aimed at impeding the practice of the Santeria
religion while failing to advance a substantial state interest.94

of the neighborhood and affect property values and tax revenue. See id The court

rejected the Planning Board's reasoning as arbitrary and unreasonable. See id. at
526.
86
See Matter of American Friends, supranote 76.
7
548 N.Y.S.2d 951 (4th Dep't 1989).
88
Id. at 952 (citing Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583, 595 (N.Y.
1986)).
89

See Holy Spirit Ass'n, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 925 ("With respect to zoning

restrictions, New York adheres to the majority view that religious institutions are

beneficial to the public welfare by their very nature.").
90
91

508 U.S. 520 (1993).
See id.at 524-25.

92

See id. at 525-26.

93
94

See id.at 526.
See id.at 546-47.
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IV. Accessory Religious Uses
Accessory uses of property are customarily anticipated
incidental or secondary uses that are either necessary or convenient
for the property owner 5 These uses must be on the same property as
the primary use and cannot alter the character of the surrounding
community.96 In the context of religious institutions, such accessory
uses may include homeless shelters,97 day care services, and retreat
centers. Additionally, these accessory uses may be considered
customary if similar religious establishments regularly use their
property for those uses as well.
In Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning
Adjustment of the Districtof Columbia,98 the court found the Zoning
Board's prohibition of the Church's "feeding of the homeless"
program to be a substantial burden on its free exercise of religion.
The Church claimed that acts of charity, such as feeding the
homeless, were not only personal decisions, but were required for
congregants' spiritual redemption.99 The court found that the feedihg
program was a proper religious use since acts of charity are
considered integral to religious worship, and therefore fell within the
protection of the First Amendment.
In Unitarian Universalist Church of Central Nassau v.
Shorten,"'0 owners of property near a church filed claims that the
church's application to build a day care center should be denied
because the proposed playground would create noise and depreciate
95

DANIEL MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW

96

Id.

§ 5.14. (3d ed. 1993).

See Greentree at Murray Hill Condominium v. Good Shepard Episcopal
Church, 550 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct., New York County 1989) (holding that
church's temporary homeless shelter was a permitted accessory use); cf., Village
of Hempstead v. Roman Catholic Church of Our Lady of Loretto at Hempstead,
604 N.Y.S.2d 131 (2d Dep't 1993) (holding that church's cellar was not a "public
space" available for a homeless shelter).
98
862 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D.D.C. 1994).
97

99

100

See id.

316 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1970).

1998]

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND ZONING

327

The court found that the
the value of the neighbors' property.'
surrounding property owners failed to prove that actual depreciation
in property value would occur because of the day care. 2 The court
based its decision on the fact that the church itself was "an
inharmonious use" within the area and the day care was not shown to
cause an additional depreciation in value to this use.01 3
In Lakeshore Assembly of God Church v. Village Boardof the
Village of Westfield, " the Zoning Board of Appeals rejected the size
of a sign that a church proposed to be erected. The Church argued
that its First Amendment rights were denied by the Board's
determination.' 5 The court disagreed and stated
It is wholly appropriate to impose limitations on a
church property and its accessory uses when
reasonably related to the general welfare of the
community, including the community interest in
10 6
preserving its appearance.
Religious establishments' recreational uses have also been
held to be permissible accessory uses. The court in Corporationof
Presiding Bishop, etc. v. Ashton, °7 held that a church's lighted
softball field was a permissible accessory use to the property's
primary use as a church. The court relied on the fact that the church
had conducted sports activities as part of its program of worship.
Playgrounds and play areas for kindergarten children have
also been held as valid accessory uses of religious establishments.'0 8

106

See id. at 839.
See id. at 842.
See id.
508 N.Y.S.2d 819 (4th Dep't 1986).
See id at 820.
Id.

107

448 P.2d 185 (Idaho 1968).

101
102
203

104
105

See Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508,
(N.Y. 1956). InSiegert v.Luney, 491 N.Y.S.2d 15 (2d Dep't 1985), the court held
that a village zoning board could not place restrictions on a synagogue's
08
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Even parking areas have been deemed accessory uses to religious
institutions." 9 However, pursuant to the interpretation of specific
ordinances, parking areas for buses may not necessarily be considered
accessory uses." A court stated that "[t]o limit a church to being
merely a house of prayer and sacrifice would, in a large degree, be
depriving the church of the opportunity of enlarging, perpetuating and
strengthening itself and the congregation. . ."' Accessory uses not
permitted by religious institutions include construction of a radio
station; 12 a ritualistic bathing area;" 3 and temporary structures." 4
V. Special Use Permits
A. Definition and Purpose
Special use permits are issued for uses identified in zoning
ordinances as appropriate to the district, but which must receive local

construction of a playground. The court held that the playground did not present
a prima facie violation of the ordinance and was an as of right use of the property.
See id. at 16. The court stated:
While a religious institution cannot be prohibited from
constructing a church, synagogue or its accessory uses, such as
a playground, where they bear a substantial relationship to the
promotion of public health, safety, morals or the community's
general welfare, appropriate restrictions may be imposed on that
construction.
Id.

See Mahrt v. First Church of Christ, 142 N.E.2d 567 (Ohio 1955).
11o
See East Side Baptist Church of Denver, Inc. v. Klein, 487 P.2d 549
(Colo. 1971).
II
See Community Synagogue v. Bates, I N.Y.2d 445, 453 (N.Y. 1956).
112
See Gallagher v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 669
(1963).
11
See Sexton v. Bates, 85 A.2d 833 (N.J. 1951).
114
See Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union, 29 N.W.2d 297 (Mich.
1947).
109
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board approval.115 This procedure grants local governments
flexibility and discretion in determining if a specific use is compatible
with the surrounding community and does not compromise the
neighborhood's character." 6 Although a religious use may be
specifically identified as a special property use, it may also fall under
the sometimes broad language of an ordinance such as "use for the
public welfare or public interest." A special use permit may not be
denied for a religious use on the basis of being contrary to the public
welfare unless it can be demonstrated that the religious use "will have
a direct and immediate adverse effect upon the heath, safety or
welfare of the community.""' 7 One commentator has observed that
"[t]he general validity of [special use permits) has been regarded as
well established under all authorities except those few that tend to8
treat any restriction on religious uses as unconstitutional.""
In Neddermeyer v. Town of Ontario PlanningBoard" the
court held that the Town Board's denial of a special permit for the use
of a residence as a church was arbitrary and capricious because the
Town Board did not render its decision based on potential adverse
effects of the religious use. The court stated
[T]he inclusion of churches among uses permitted in
a zoning district is tantamount to a legislative
determination that the use is in harmony with the
general zoning plan and will not be detrimental to the

1is

116

17
118
119

See N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-b (McKinney 1997):
'[S]pecial use permit' shall mean an authorization of a particular
land use which is permitted in a zoning ordinance or local law,
subject to requirements imposed by such zoning ordinance or
local law to assure that the proposed use is in harmony with such
zoning ordinance or local law and will not adversely affect the
neighborhood if such requirements are met.
See MANDELKER, supranote 95, § 6.58.
Westchester Reform Temple, 22 N.Y.2d at 494.
See Zoning Privateand ParochialSchools, supra note 8, § 12.03.
548 N.Y.S.2d 951 (4th Dep't 1989).
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surrounding area . . . That presumption [that a
religious use will have a beneficial effect in a
residential area] may be rebutted with evidence of a
significant impact on 'on traffic congestion, property
values, municipal services' and the like. 20

In Covenant Community Church, Inc. v. Town of Gates
Zoning Board of Appeals, ' l the Covenant Community Church
claimed that the Zoning Board of Appeals' decision to deny a
conditional use permit for construction of a church, religious school,
and day care center was arbitrary and capricious. The church
petitioner purchased 11.44 acres of property zoned as R-1-1 1.122 In
this area, "churches and their customary accessory uses" were
permitted upon the issuance of a conditional use permit.' At the
public hearing concerning the permit application, a petition consisting
of over 1100 townspeople's signatures was presented in opposition to
the application.'24 The court, in considering whether the Zoning
Board's determination was correct, sought to determine if the Board
had attempted to accommodate the religious use of property.'25 The

12
121
122
123

Id (quoting Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583, 595 (N.Y. 1986)).
444 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct., Monroe County 1981).
See id. at 417.
See id.

124

See id.

125

See id.at 420-21. The Board rejected the permit application and stated:
[T]he proposed use intended by the applicant would: 1) Not be

in harmony with the general purpose, and intent of the
Ordinance, or the residential area of its intended location; and 2)
That the intended use would be detrimental to the residential
zone of this site, and/or adjacent zones, taking into account the
location, size of the use, the nature and intensity of the
operations involved with it, and the size of the site in respect to
streets giving access thereto. 3) That the intended use would be
detrimental to the health, safety, or general welfare of all
persons residing, traveling, or working in the vicinity of the
proposed use, and further 4) That the intended use would be
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court held that in consideration of the Town's misstated factual
findings,126 the determination did not have a rational basis. 27
Therefore, the court found the Zoning Board's determination to be
arbitrary and capricious.'28
In Independent Church of the Realization of the Word of God
v. Boardof Zoning Appeals,129 the court affirmed the Zoning Board
of Appeals' rejection of a special use permit for a religious use. The
religious institution applied for a special use permit to use a fortyroom house on 14.2 acres of property as a "religious retreat house and
church with facilities for 40-50 permanent occupants."' 3 ° The town
ordinance authorized permits for property uses of "church[es] for
public worship."'31 Testimony given at trial indicated that the
property would not be used as a public house of worship.3 2 In
addition, the number of occupants in the retreat house would exceed
the number permitted by the ordinance.'33 Since the use would not be
in conformance with the ordinance, the court affirmed the Board's
4
13

determination.

detrimental and injurious to the residential property, and
improvements in the residential neighborhood, and to the general
welfare of the Town.
Id. at 422.
126
See id at 421. The court, for example, considered the Town's incorrectly
cited size of the congregation, which consisted of 200 members, not 1200.
Additionally, the Town alleged that the premises were to be used for Bingo and
dancing. Whereas the congregants allege that such activities are against their
religious beliefs.
127
328

129

130
13
132

See id.
See id. at 423.

437 N.Y.S.2d 443 (2d Dep't 1981).
Id. at 444.
See id.
See id.

See id The ordinance only permitted ten permanent occupants to reside
at a retreat house.
134
See id.at 445.
13
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B. Additional Permit Considerations
Religious institutions may be required to procure special
permits under conditions that are applicable to all property owners.' 35
For example, if the religious use of the property has a substantial
negative impact on the community, an application for a special use
permit for a religious use may be denied. This is true whether the
permit is for a church or a bingo hall. Moreover, when considering
whether a special permit should be issued, the reviewing body may
consider what uses the religious organization plans for the property.
For example, whether the religious institution plans on sponsoring a
day care facility or homeless shelter, may be considered when
reviewing a permit application. In New York, one court held that a
religious institution's application for a special permit could not be
demonstrated that the board
denied unless it could be affirmatively
136
attempted to accommodate the use.
In Harrison Orthodox Minyan, Inc. v. Town Board of
Harrison,137 a religious institution's application for a special
exception use permit was denied by the Town Board. The religious
establishment applied for a permit to use a private residence for
religious services. 138 The Town Board denied the permit without
attempting to accommodate the religious use of the property. The
court, in holding that the Town Board abused its discretion, stated
Although there is no exemption from zoning rules for
religious uses, nor is there any conclusive
presumption that any religious use automatically
outweighs its ill effects, where the applicant is a

35
136

See ANDERSON, supra note 74, § 12.23.

See Harrison Orthodox Minyan, Inc. v. Harrison, 552 N.Y.S.2d 434 (2d

Dep't 1990).
137

Id.

138

See id.at 434-35.
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religious institution, more flexibility is required and
efforts must be made to accommodate the religious
use, if possible.

139

On the other hand, courts have invalidated ordinances in cases
where the permitting process did not contain specific standards for the
administrative agency to adhere to, thereby allowing permits to be
approved or denied upon discriminatory grounds. 4 ' Religious
institutions cannot be denied special use permits unless they do not
meet the requirements stated in the ordinance. Therefore, ordinances
should specify the goals of the community in regulating certain uses
and the injuries that are sought to be avoided.' An ordinance, if it
does not specify the objectives for its enactment, or the standards to
be applied by the reviewing body, may be invalidated as arbitrary and
capricious.' 42 Considerations in determining whether a special use
permit should be granted include, in addition to traffic and noise, loss
of privacy, loss of property values, fumes and lights. 43
39

See id. at 435.

See Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 136 N.E.2d 827 (N.Y. 1956)
(stating that adverse effect upon property values, loss of potential tax revenue, and
decreased enjoyment of surrounding land could not be considered in rendering
zoning decisions).
140

141
See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., ZONING AND LAND USE LIBRARY, 1993
ZONINGAND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK, § 12.03 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 1993).

See State ex al. Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggemeier, 115 N.E.2d
65, 69 (N.Y. 1953) (realtor planned on constructing a church on residentially zoned
property; permit was denied based on alleged public safety concerns regarding
increased traffic. The Court of Appeals found that since the ordinance did not
specifically mention traffic concerns, it could not be the basis for the permit's
denial.).
143
See Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 330 P.2d 5 (Or. 1958)(considerations
in denying permit included traffic hazards, lights, and fumes); West Hartford
Methodist Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 121 A.2d 640 (Conn. 1956)(in
reviewing the zoning board's rejection of a church's building permit application,
the court considered whether the erection of a church would substantially injure the
surrounding properties; the court noted that surrounding properties' "values will
fall."
142
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In some instances, legal issues arise where a religious
institution may be exempt from obtaining a special use permit where
other property owners must obtain them. In Cohen v. City of Des
Plaines,1" a case from the state of Illinois, an applicant for a special
use permit to operate a day care center in a residential district alleged
that her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated
because she was required to apply for a permit while churchsponsored day care centers were exempt from the permit
requirement.145 The court held the ordinance constitutional because
the local government: (1) was attempting not to intermingle religious
and governmental decisions; and (2) it was rational to allow churches
that were already providing community services to continue to do
SO.146

VI. Variances for Religious Uses
A. Use Variances
Pursuant to New York Town Law Section 267-b, a use
variance cannot be granted unless the applicant can demonstrate that
the zoning ordinance has caused unnecessary hardship.'47 In order to

144
145

8 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1993).
See id.

See id. at 492-93.
N.Y. ToWN LAw § 267-b (2)(b)(McKinney 1997). See also N.Y.
VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-b; N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 81 (b) (McKinney 1997):
146
147

No .. .use variance shall be granted by a board of appeals

without a showing by the applicant that applicable zoning
regulations and restrictions have caused unnecessary hardship.
In order to prove such unnecessary hardship the applicant shall
demonstrate to the board of appeals that for each and every
permitted use under the zoning regulations for the particular
district where the property is located, (1) the applicant cannot
realize a reasonable return, provided that lack of return is
substantial as demonstrated by competent financial evidence; (2)
that the alleged hardship relating to the property in question is
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prove that an unnecessary hardship has occurred, the applicant must
demonstrate
(1) that the applicant cannot realize a reasonable
return, provided that lack of return is substantial as
demonstrated by competent financial evidence; (2)
that the alleged hardship relating to the property in
question is unique, and does not apply to a substantial
portion of the district or neighborhood; (3) that the
requested use variance, if granted, will not alter the
essential character of the neighborhood; and (4) that
4
the alleged hardship has not been self-created. 1
Although it has not been addressed by New York courts, a religious
institution will most likely not be required to demonstrate' that it
49
cannot get a reasonable returm
s
In Bright 1Torizon: House; .Ie:v:,ZoningBoarofAppeat&3
the petitioner corToration: orgarrize&di to' maintain a Cliristian Sciencm
health care ficifit-." The petitioner purchased eleven acres of
property in order-to establish a facility with thirty-two living units in
a district that was zoned as R-1-15. 152 This zoning designation
allowed for: "Churches, schools and institutions of higher education,
public hospitals, public libraries and municipal and special district

148

unique, and does not apply to a substantial portion of the district
or neighborhood; (3)that the requested use variance, if granted,
will not alter the essential character of the neighborhood; and (4)
that the alleged hardship has not been self-created.
Id See also Bright Horizon House, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 469

N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct., Monroe County 1983).
149
It is important to note that the exclusion of a religious use would probably

be challenged as unconstitutional rather than through a use variance request. This
is based on New York courts' view that religious uses cannot be completely
excluded from a community.
50
469 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1983).
15
See id.at 852.
152

See id
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buildings, provided that no such buildings shall be located within fifty
(50) feet of any adjoining lot line ... .""' The facility would be
operated by Christian Science nurses and practitioners.' 54 Such
practitioners practice healing and nursing techniques as described in
55
the Christian Science Church Manual.
The Zoning Board of Appeals determined that the proposed
facility was "neither a church, a public hospital or conventional health
care facility' and that neither economic hardship nor hardship caused
by any uniqueness of the land had been established so as to warrant
the granting of a variance." '56 The petitioner contended that the
Board erroneously construed the definition of "church.' 57 The court,
although indicating that the definition was not wholly applicable to
this case, cited In re Community Synagogue v. Bates,' and stated
A church is more than merely an edifice affording
people the opportunity to worship God. Strictly
religious uses and activities are more than prayer and
sacrifice and all churches recognize that the area of
their responsibility is broader than leading the
congregation in prayer.'59
The court, recognizing that the facility was a separate organization
that was not affiliated with the Christian Science Church, also noted
that the purpose of the facility was not "public worship."' 6 ° The
proposed facility was found by the court to be more like a nursing
facility than a church. Moreover, the court stated that the fact that

153

Id. at 853.

See id.
See id. The Christian Science Church advocates healing through the
power of faith and therefore, does not rely on traditional medical practices. See id.
156
Id. at 854.
157
See id.
158
136 N.E.2d 488 (N.Y. 1956).
159
469 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
154

155

160

See id.
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facility than a church. Moreover, the court stated that the fact that
individuals paid room and board and could remain at the facility for
six months, made the facility more like a residence than a religious
facility.
B. Area Variances
Section 267-b of New York Town Law states that a zoning
board of appeals, when considering whether to grant an area variance,
must weigh the benefits conferred upon the applicant if the variance
is granted against the detriment to the community. 6' In weighing
these matters, the zoning board of appeals must consider
(1) whether an undesirable change will be produced in
the character of the neighborhood or a detriment to
nearby properties will be created by the granting of
the variance; (2) whether the benefit sought by the
applicant can be achieved by some method, feasible
for the applicant to pursue, other than an area
variance; (3) whether the requested area variance is
substantial; (4) whether the proposed variance will
have an adverse effect or impact on the physical or
environmental conditions in the neighborhood or

161

N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b (3)(b)(McKinney 1997).
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district; and (5) whether the alleged difficulty was
62
self-created.

In Young Israel of North Woodmere v. Town of Hempstead
Board of Zoning Appeals 63 a non-profit religious corporation
operated a synagogue in a single-family house in an area zoned for
residential use only. 64 After thirteen years of operating the
synagogue, the operators applied to the Town of Hempstead
(Town)for an amendment to the synagogue's certificate of occupancy
to permit the use of the residence as a synagogue. The permit was
denied because the synagogue use violated the Town's off-street
6
parking and side-yard setback requirements. 1
The petitioners applied for off-street and side-yard setback
variances to which the Town granted the side-yard variance without
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267b (3)(b). See also N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §7-712-b;
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 81-b (4)(b) (McKinney 1997):
162

163
164
165

In making its determination [to grant an area variance], the
zoning board of appeals shall take into consideration the benefit
to the applicant if the variance is granted, as weighed against the
detriment to the health, safety and welfare of the neighborhood
or community by such grant. In making such determination the
board shall consider: (1) whether an undesirable change will be
produced in the character of the neighborhood or a detriment to
nearby properties will be created by the granting of the area
variance; (2) whether the benefit sought by the applicant can be
achieved by some method, feasible for the applicant to pursue,
other than the area variance; (3) whether the requested area
variance is substantial; (4) whether the proposed variance will
have an adverse affect or impact on the physical or
environmental conditions in the neighborhood or district; and (5)
whether the alleged difficulty was self-created; which
consideration shall be relevant to the decision of the board of
appeals, but shall not necessarily preclude the granting of the
area variance.
634 N.Y.S.2d 199 (2d Dep't 1995).
See id. at 200.
See id.
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exception, and granted the parking variance with a number of
conditions.'66 The conditions included a limit of 125 people on the
premises at one time, limited membership to fifty families, prohibited
the performance of the religious ceremony "Bris" on the property,
limited the rabbi's lecture to one per week (to be attended by fewer
than five people), limited the size of the sign to be placed on the
premises and prohibited the erection of a large tent on the property
during Jewish holidays.167
The court, although it found the limitation on the number of
people allowed in the building a sufficient mitigation to any
disturbances created by off-street parking, held that the Board's
limitation on the synagogue's membership was not a "rational
exercise of the Board's duty to accommodate a religious use while
mitigating a particular adverse effect."' 68 Therefore, the limitation
was held to be arbitrary and capricious.'69 The court also reasoned
that the sign and tent limitations were beyond the Town's authority. 7 °
In In re Mikveh South Shore Congregation,Inc. v. Granito,7 '
the Board of Zoning Appeals denied variance applications of a
religious institution to reconstruct its property for use as a mikveh.'72
The property owner applied for two variances: a waiver of the offstreet parking requirements and a waiver of the twenty foot side-yard
requirement. 73 The Board of Zoning Appeals denied the variances
because of inadequate evacuation room in case of a fire in relation to
the side-yard requirement and because the requested parking variance
would cause traffic hazards. 74 The court affirmed the lower court's
decision annulling the Zoning Board's determination stating that its

166
167
168
169
170

171
172
173
174

See id.
See id.
Id. at 201.
See id.
See id.
432 N.Y.S.2d 638 (2d Dep't 1980).
See id.at 639. The property had been significantly damaged by a fire.
See id.
See id.
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findings were not substantiated by "hard evidence" or "expert
testimony" regarding potential fire and traffic hazards.'75
VII. Home Worship
Property used for home worship presents a particularly
difficult issue for local zoning boards to decide. For example, the
government may have zoned an area for strictly residential use. The
residents, however, may have converted portions of their homes into
religious worship areas. The municipality may have received
complaints about increased traffic congestion, noise and parking. The
municipality must balance these factors and consider whether it can
regulate the home worship practices.
In Nichols v. Planning and Zoning Commission 76 the
defendant belonged to a biblical research, teaching and fellowship
ministry which required that followers integrate their religious lives
into their personal lives through discussion with other members at
regular meetings.171 Up to ten followers attended meetings at the
defendant's home three times a week.' Neighbors reported that
religious services were being conducted on the defendant's property
and he was directed to apply for a special application to the Planning
and Zoning Commission.'79 The relevant regulations applicable to
one-family residential districts in the Town are as follows:
4.1.6. The Commission may approve the following
individual uses as special cases and subject to
conditions as the commission may impose, giving

175
176

177
178

179

See id.

667 F. Supp. 72 (D. Conn. 1987).
See id. at 75.

See id.
See id.
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consideration to the effect of the proposed use on
present and future dwellings in the vicinity, to the
proposed site planning and landscaping, to the
conditions affecting traffic safety, to the provisions for
off-street parking and to other standards provided in
these regulations. 4.1.6.3 A church, parish hall, or
other religious use, but excluding a cemetery.'

The defendant was informed that if he did not cease the
religious meetings he would be fined. Several other letters were sent
to the defendant, identifying "other religious uses" as the violation he
was being charged with. The court held that the term "religious uses"
was unconstitutionally vague and inhibited the religious group's right
of association and free exercise of religion.'
VIH. Non-conforming Uses
In New York, non-confomling uses are generally viewed "as
detrimental to a zoning scheme; and the overriding public policy of
zoning . . . is aimed at their reasonable restriction and eventual
elimination."'8 2 A non-conforming use "is created when a zoning
provision is adopted or amended to prohibit a particular use that
lawfully existed prior to the enactment or amendment."' 83 In order to
prevent the property owner who has a non-conforming use from
incurring economic losses, town boards allow the use to continue
despite its non-conformance with the new zoning provisions.

ISO
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Id.
See id. at 77.

Matter of Toys "R" Us v. Silva, 89 N.Y.2d 411, 417 (1996); see also
Rudolf Steiner Fellowship Foundation v. De Luccia, 1997 WL 364797 (N.Y.
1997).
183
John Nolon, Land Use Law Center, Nonconforming Uses Bulletin (visited
Oct. 13, 1997) <http://www.law.pace.edu/landuse/noncon.html>.
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In Province of Meribah Society of Mary, Inc. v. Village of
Muttontown8 4 the plaintiff owned property in a residentially zoned
district. Although the zoning ordinance permitted "churches for
public worship and other strictly religious uses," the plaintiff had not
acquired a permit for the use of his property as a religious retreat
house.8' Building permit applications for such uses were examined
by the Board of Zoning Appeals which considered the applicant's site
plan and testimony at public hearings.'86
The property owner applied for a building permit fifteen years
subsequent to his initial use of the property for a retreat house." 7 The
zoning ordinance, by that time, had been altered to include "retreat
houses.., only when authorized as a special use permit by the Zoning
Board of Appeals."'8 8 After the permit had been denied and the
decision appealed, the Board of Zoning Appeals granted the permit
subject to ten conditions.8 9 The property owner commenced an
action claiming that six of the ten conditions were arbitrary and
capricious.' 9 °
The property owner additionally alleged that the use of his
property was a legal non-conforming use.' 9' The court rejected the
claim, stating that such a use must be legally created. In this case, the
property owner did not have a building permit for the retreat house as
required by the zoning ordinance, therefore, the use was not legally
created.' 92 The court found two of the ten conditions attached to the
issued permit to be invalid based on the fact that they regulated the
operations ofthe retreat house, rather than the land and its effect upon
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538 N.Y.S.2d 850 (2d Dep't 1989).

See id.at 851.
See id.
See id.

See id. at 851-52 (citing Building Zone Ordinance § 5.0(e)).
See id at 852.
See id.
See id.

See id.
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the surrounding area. 9 3 In addition, the court held that three of the
remaining conditions were beyond the Zoning Board of Appeals'
194
authority.

IX. Historic Landmark Preservation
Particular buildings may have sufficient historical significance
for a local government to forbid their destruction or alteration.'95
Unlike historic districts,'96 landmarks are often isolated from
surroundings of similarly-situated buildings. In Penn Central
Transportation Co.. v. New York City, 97 the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld an historic landmark designation of Grand Central Terminal
which exemplifies French beaux art styles.'98 The plaintiffs planned
to construct an office building on top of the train station.'99 The Court
recognized the public benefit rendered by the protection of historical
landmarks and stated
[L]andmark laws are not like discriminatory, or
'reverse spot,' zoning: that is, a land-use decision
which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for

193
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See id. at 853.
See id.
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See DANIEL

MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW,

§ 1.05 (3rd ed. 1993).

Legislatures sometimes enact historic district zoning ordinances with the
goal of preserving the character of historical neighborhoods and buildings. Such
ordinances regulate construction or development that is not compatible with the
historical character of the designated area. This type of zoning insinuates an
aesthetic consideration into land use concepts that, until recently, has been absent.
Today, a majority of courts view aesthetic considerations as valid land use
concerns. In New York, however, conflicts between historic districts and
landmarks preservation law and religious uses have generally been resolved in
favor of the regulatory body.
197
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
198
See id.at 115.
199
See id.at 116.
196

344

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 5
different, less favorable treatment than the
neighboring ones. In contrast to discriminatory
zoning, which is the antithesis of land-use control as
part of some comprehensive plan, the New York City
law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve
structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever
they might be found in the city....?"

In the seminal New York case of St. Bartholomew's Church
v. City of New York 2 ' a church brought an action against the New
York
City Landmarks
Preservation
Commission
for
2
0
2
unconstitutionally burdening its free exercise of religion. St.
Bartholomew's Church planned to replace one of its auxiliary
buildings with an office building.20 3 Determining that the Church and
its auxiliary building, the Community House, had a "special
character, special historical and aesthetic interest and value as part of
the development, heritage and cultural aspects of New York City,"
the Landmarks Preservation Commission (Commission) designated
both buildings as landmarks.2" 4 Pursuant to New York City
Administrative Code § 25-305(a)(1), that designation prohibited the
Church from demolishing or altering the buildings without prior
Commission approval. 0 5
The Church applied for a certificate of appropriateness to
transform the Community House into a fifty-nine story office tower
and, again, the next year for a forty-seven story office building; both
proposals were rejected by the Commission.2 6 The Church then filed
for a hardship exception to replace the Community House, claiming

200
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204
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See id.at 132 (citation omitted).
914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990).
See id.
See id.at 350.
See id. at 351.

See id.
See id.
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that the building was inadequate for religious purposes. °7 The
Commission, following extensive hearings and testimony, rejected
the application stating that the Church had failed to prove the
hardship. 8 The Church claimed that the Landmarks Law violated its
First Amendment rights by excessively burdening the free exercise of
religion." 9
The Church argued before the Second Circuit that the
Landmarks Law impaired its ability to expand its charitable programs
by disallowing it from using its property in a profitable manner.210
The Church intended to use the money that it would make from the
office building to support its religious and charitable programs.'
The court held that since the Landmarks Law is a generally applicable
and facially neutral regulation that had an incidental effect on a
religious activity, it was constitutional."
In Church of St. Pauland St. Andrew v. Barwicke 3 a church
sought a declaratory judgement establishing that the New York
Landmarks Law was unconstitutional. The Church developed a plan
to renovate its buildings and construct a commercial high-rise
condominium. However, the Church and its buildings were deemed
landmarks prior to the commencement of any construction. 2' 4 The
Church argued that the building, which was built to seat 1400
congregants, was too large and unsuitable for its membership.
Financial burdens presented by maintaining such a large facility
prompted the Church to consult architects for a rebuilding plan.2" 5
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See id. at 352.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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See id. at 353-54.
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See id. at 354. The Landmarks Law applied to "any improvement, any
part of which is thirty years or older, which has a special character or special
historical or aesthetic interest or value." N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 25-302(n) (1986).
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496 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y. 1986).
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The Court of Appeals examined whether the Church's claims were
ripe for judicial review.216
The court addressed whether the ripeness issue should ,be
"different because plaintiff is a church and bases its constitutional
claim in part on prospective interference with its right of free exercise
of religion."2 7 Although the court noted that churches are afforded
protected status with regard to governmental interference in areas
such as zoning, it stated that the effect of the landmark designation
was "purely consequential . . . and contingent on future
developments."2 8" Therefore, the court held that the prospective
the right of free exercise of
interference of the Landmarks Law with219
religion was not ripe for judicial review.
In Society for Ethical Culture in the City of New York v.
Spatt220 the Court of Appeals held that a religious organization was

properly prevented from demolishing a meeting house to build
market-rate apartments to secure funding for its religious activities.
The plaintiff claimed that the free exercise clause of the Constitution
216
217
218

Id at 185
Id. at 191.
Id. at 191-92.

The dissent, however, argued that the landmark designation itself
"inflict[ed] immediate, concrete injury upon the protected First Amendment
activities of' the church." The dissent stated, "[a]side, from the maintenance and
repair requirements, the church faces the very real possibility that its program for
obtaining the means necessary to carry on its religious and charitable work will be
thwarted by its financial position and the time and effort to litigate through all the
procedural steps to which the majority and the Commission would subject it." Id.
at 202.
220
415 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1980). Compare with Lutheran Church in America
v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1974). In that case, the court held that
a landmark designation of a charitable association's building was void because the
designation caused hardship on the owners. See id. at 307. The church wanted to
demolish its building but was prevented under the Landmarks Preservation Law
without approval by the Landmarks Preservation Commission. See id. The court
stated, "the existing building is totally inadequate for plaintiff's legitimate needs
and must be replaced if plaintiff is to be able freely and economically to use the
premises .... I"d. at 312.
219
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was violated by the ordinance.22 ' The plaintiff additionally claimed
that the landmark designation prevented it from realizing the "full
economic value" of its property.222 The court found that because of
the secular nature of the proposed use of the property, no First
Amendment violation had occurred.223
Other judicial jurisdictions address the impact of landmark
preservation laws on religious facilities differently. For example, in
First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle,224 the Seattle Landmarks
Preservation Board designated First Covenant Church as a
landmark.225 The Church, although it had not requested permits for
any construction or alterations of the building, claimed that the
designation was unconstitutional.226 The Church claimed that because
of the landmark designation it (1) had its freedom to alter the exterior
of the church interfered with; (2) was required to obtain secular
approval for any alterations; (3) was limited in its ability to sell the
property; and (4) suffered a depreciation in value of $300,000.227 The
City of Seattle claimed that the Church had not suffered an injury and
therefore its claims were premature. 228 The trial court dismissed the
Church's claim; it was subsequently certified to the Supreme Court
of Washington. The Washington Supreme Court stated the issue to
be "whether the law should prefer religious freedom or an exercise of
the police power to maintain the architectural and cultural interests
associated with landmark preservation., 229 The court reversed the
trial court, stating that since the landmarks ordinance required the
Church to obtain secular approval prior to building, it violated the

221

415 N.E.2d 924. The plaintiffs argued that the landmark designation

additionally constituted an unconstitutional taking. See id.
m
Id.
See id. at 926.
224
787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990), vacated,499 U.S. 901 (1991).
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See id. at 1354.
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See id.
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See id. at 1355.
See id.
See id. at 1356.
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Church's right of free exercise.230 Further, the court stated,
"[b]alancing the right of free exercise with the aesthetic and
community values associated with landmark preservation, we find
that the latter is clearly outweighed by the constitutional protection of
free exercise of religion and the public benefits associated with the
practice of religious worship within the community.231 The U.S.
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for further
consideration based on its decision in Employment Division v. Smith
which altered the analysis for violation of exercise of religion
claims. 2 The Washington Supreme Court, on remand held that the
ordinance violated the Church's right of free exercise.233 The court
stated that when the interior and exterior of a church are "freighted
with religious meaning that would be understood by those who view
it, then the regulation of the church's exterior impermissibly infringes
on the religious organization's right to free exercise and free
speech. 234 Additionally, the court found that the administrative
burden caused by secular approval before any alterations were made
to the church was unconstitutional.235
In Boerne v. Flores," a church planned to expand the size of
its building to accommodate its growing membership. The archbishop
applied for a building permit to expand the size of the church to
accommodate its increasing congregation. 237 Before the necessary
building permit could be obtained, the city established an historic
district that included the church property.238 The ordinance required
city approval of any construction affecting historic buildings within
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See id. at 1360.
See id. at 1361.

See First Covenant Church, 499 U.S. at 901 (citing 494 U.S. 872 (1991)).
840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1993).
See id. at 181.
See id. at 183.
117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
See id. at 2160.
See id.
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the district. 9 City officials rejected the archbishop's building permit
request because the plans involved the destruction of all but the
facade of the church building which illustrates mission revival
architecture emblematic of the original Spanish missions in Southern
Texas. 4 The archbishop claimed that the ordinance violated RFRA,
since the existing building was not large enough to serve all of its
parishioners: a matter involving the free exercise of their religion. 4 '
The U.S. Supreme Court, in its decision, invalidated RFRA, which
had the effect of leaving the regulations in place and sustaining the
city's denial of the building permit.242
X. Conclusion
The authority to control land uses has afforded local
governments the opportunity to regulate religious uses. In New York,
this authority allows village and city boards to flexibly interpret
religious uses and protect them from potential adverse effects of
zoning ordinances. For over fifty years, New York village and city
boards have recognized the benefits provided by allowing religious
establishments and uses to exist within residentially zoned areas.
The authority to enact police power regulations is vested in
state legislatures, however, this authority has been delegated broadly
to local governments. The local governments are authorized to
regulate land uses pursuant to police power objectives. Zoning
restrictions imposed by local governments must reasonably and
substantially relate to the objectives of protecting the public safety,
health, morals, and welfare. Oftentimes, local governments enact
zoning ordinances that limit or regulate property owned by religious
institutions.
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In order to be considered a religious land use, the property
must be used, on a regular basis, for religious services, such as a place
of worship, or other activity related to the institution's religious
mission. Religious uses of property include houses of worship, home
prayer services, day care centers, and homeless shelters. These
religious uses of property are somewhat insulated from the restrictive
provisions of zoning ordinances based on the assumption that the
religious institutions' services are beneficial to the public's welfare.
Village and city boards allow religious institutions to operate
accessory uses, which are customary and incidental uses of the
institution's property. These uses must be on the same property as the
primary use and cannot alter the character of the surrounding
community. In the context of religious institutions, such accessory
uses may include homeless shelters, day care services, and retreat
centers. These accessory uses may be considered customary if similar
religious establishments regularly use their property for those uses as
well.
Special use permits grant local governments discretion in
determining where and how religious institutions may operate. The
uses are identified in zoning ordinances as appropriate to the area, but
which must receive local board approval. This type of permit may not
be denied for a religious use on the basis of being contrary to the
public welfare unless it can be demonstrated that the religious use
will adversely affect the public health, welfare and morals.
Area and use variances provide religious establishments with
the opportunity to apply to town boards for permits to expand the uge
of their land. This expansion may include altering the use of the land,
from a non-religious use to a religious one, or altering the physical
attributes of the religious building. In determining if a variance
should be granted, town boards will look at whether the religious use
will alter the character of the surrounding neighborhood.
In order to receive a use variance, the religious institution
must demonstrate that the zoning ordinance has caused the institution
an unnecessary hardship. This can be proved, as detailed in New York
Town Law § 267-b, by demonstrating that the alleged hardship is
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unique to the institution's property; that the use variance will not alter
the essential character of the neighborhood; and that the hardship has
not been self-created.
For an area variance to be granted, a zoning board of appeals
must weigh the benefits conferred upon the institution if the area
variance is granted against the detriment to the community. The
zoning board of appeals must consider whether granting the variance
will produce a detriment to the neighborhood's character; whether an
alternative method is available for the religious institution to pursue;
whether the requested variance is substantial; whether it will have an
adverse effect on the physical or environmental character of the
neighborhood; and whether the alleged difficulty was self-created.
Since religious institutions are presumed to benefit the
surrounding community, granting of area variances to the institutions
is often based upon the physical effects that may emerge, such as
traffic or fire hazards.
Non-conforming uses, although viewed as adverse to the
general zoning scheme, are allowed in communities in order to
mitigate the economic effects upon the landowner. Such uses are
created when a zoning ordinance is adopted and prohibits a certain
use that legally existed prior to the enactment of the ordinance.
Occasionally, property may already be used for religious purposes
when an ordinance is enacted that limits that land use. In such cases,
the religious institution must demonstrate that the use "legally
existed" prior to the enactment of the ordinance.
Historic landmark preservation designations, although not
strictly protective of religious institutions, allow for local
governments to regulate the alteration of buildings or particular
neighborhoods in order to preserve the historical character of the area.
New York courts view aesthetic, historical considerations as valid
land use concerns and often balance the religious use of the property
against the protection of the building's aesthetic value. However,
conflicts between historic landmark preservation law and religious
uses have generally been resolved in favor of the regulatory body.

